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[null,"Prepared By:","Contributors:"]
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["Lex Mundi Global Anti-Corruption Compliance Guide"]
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["Report Generated: 5/1/2025"]
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["Question","Hungary"]
["Anti-Corruption Compliance"]
["What is the key anti-bribery and corruption legislation in your jurisdiction?","The foundational anti-bribery and corruption provisions are stipulated in \nChapter XXVII of Act C of 2012 on the \nCriminal Code (“\nCriminal Code”). \nAct CLXV of 2013 provides a complaint-procedure related to the infringement of personal rights or interest committed by state institutions/bodies in cases where these acts are not subject to any other procedures.  \n\n\n \n"]
["Has there been a specific anti-bribery and corruption law enacted in your jurisdiction in the last ten years?"," The relevant anti-bribery and corruption laws enacted in the last ten years include: \n\n \n\t the new Hungarian Criminal Code was enacted in 2012 and came into force on the 1st of July, 2013.  However, the previous criminal code included very similar provisions to corruption crimes; \n\t Act CLXV of 2013 is a specific anti-bribery and corruption law that was enacted in 2013 and came into force on the 1st of January, 2014; and \n\t Government Decree 50/2013 (II. 25.) on the system of integrity management at public administration bodies and the procedural rules of receiving lobbyists was enacted in 2013 and the majority of its provisions came into force on the 27th of March, 2013. \n \n\n The law specifically deals with bribery and corruption-related issues affecting governmental bodies. The Act constitutes the foundational internal framework for governmental bodies and agencies with the aim of minimizing the risk of being subjected to bribery/corruption. \n"]
["Is a bribe payment to domestic government officials prohibited by the legislation?"," \n\t A bribe payment to domestic government officials is prohibited by the Hungarian legislation. Active Corruption of Public Officials is a felony regulated under Subsection (1) of Section 293 of the Criminal Code : any person who attempts to bribe a public official by giving or promising unlawful advantage to such person or to another person for influencing such official’s actions in an official capacity is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment not exceeding three years. The Hungarian judicial practice considers the crime to be concluded once the unlawful advantage has been promised, even without the public official accepting the advantage in question. [Active Corruption of Public Officials] \n\t Under Subsection (4) of Section 293 of the Criminal Code , the director of an economic operator, or any person working for or on behalf of the economic operator vested with the authority to exercise control or supervision shall be punished – with the same terms - as under Subsection (1), if the person working for or on behalf of the economic operator commits the referred criminal offense for the benefit of the economic operator or on its behalf, and the criminal act could have been prevented had he properly fulfilled his control or supervisory obligations. [Active Corruption of Public Officials] \n\t Pursuant to Subsection (1a) of Section 298 of the Criminal Code , any person who gives or promises unlawful advantage on account of a person who claims to be a public official, or on account of such person shall be punishable by imprisonment up to three years [Indirect Corruption]. If the perpetrator believes the person in question to be a public official, he commits the crime of Indirect Corruption once the unlawful promise has been given or promised. \n \n"]
["Is a bribe payment to foreign government officials prohibited by the legislation?"," A bribe payment to foreign government officials is prohibited by the Hungarian legislation. \n\n In relation to specific crimes where international treaty commitments or obligations arising from legal acts of the European Union necessitate, each section includes a separate subsection that extends the scope of the given crime to foreign public officials. The actions prohibited and the penalties in relation to domestic and foreign public officials are the same. \n\n Pursuant to Subsection (3) of Section 293 of the Criminal Code , the penalties applied in case of an Active Corruption of Public Officials ( Subsection (1) and (2) of the same Section ) shall apply to any person who commits the criminal offense set out therein in connection with a foreign public official. The Hungarian judicial practice handles the attempt to bribe more than one public official – even with the same act of perpetration – as multiple counts of the crime of Active Corruption of Public Officials. \n\n Moreover, as the actions prohibited in relation to foreign public officials are the same as to domestic public officials, the above mentioned continue to apply so according to Subsection (4) of 293 the director of an economic operator, or any person working for or on behalf of the economic operator vested with the authority to exercise control or supervision shall be punishable according to Subsection (1) if the person working for or on behalf of the economic operator commits the criminal offense defined in Subsections (1)-(3) for the benefit of the economic operator or on its behalf, and the criminal act could have been prevented had he properly fulfilled his control or supervisory obligations. Pursuant to Subsection (3) of Section 298 the provision of Subsection (1) shall apply when the criminal offenses defined in Subsections (1a) are committed in connection with a foreign public official, that is to say, if any person who gives or promises unlawful advantage to a third person on account of a person who claims to be a (foreign) public official, or on account of such person. \n\n Pursuant to Subsection (1) of Section 459 of the Criminal Code , foreign public officials are the following: \n\n \n\t a person serving in the legislature, judicial, administrative or law enforcement body of a foreign State; and/or persons exercising executive powers or serving in foreign states, including persons exercising executive powers or serving in public bodies or in State or municipal government-owned companies, \n\t a person serving in an international organization created under an international treaty ratified by an act of Parliament, whose activities form part of the organization’s activities; \n\t a person elected to serve in the general assembly or body of an international organization created under an international treaty ratified by an act of Parliament, including members of the European Parliament elected abroad; and \n\t a member of an international court that is vested with jurisdiction over the territory or over the citizens of Hungary, and any person serving in such international court, whose activities form part of the court’s activities. \n \n"]
["Is requesting or accepting a bribe prohibited by the legislation?"," Pursuant to Subsection (1) of Section 291 of the Criminal Code , any person who requests or receives an unlawful advantage in connection with his activities performed for or on behalf of an economic operator, for himself or for a third party, or accepts a promise of such an advantage, or is in league with the person requesting or accepting the advantage for a third party on his behest, is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment not exceeding three years (Passive Corruption). The relevant statutory provision’s purpose is to protect the clarity and honest nature of economic and social relations, with specific attention to private matters.  \n\n Passive Corruption of Public Officials is punishable by law under Subsection (1) of Section 294 of the Criminal Code : any public official who requests or receives an unlawful advantage in connection with his actions in an official capacity, for himself or for a third party, or accepts a promise of such unlawful advantage, or is in league with the person requesting or accepting the unlawful advantage for a third party on his behest, is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment between one to five years. The purpose of the provision is to protect the social trust that public officials enjoy. If the action specified above is carried out by a public official, it is considered to be an aggravating circumstance by the Criminal Code under Subsection (2) of the same Section . \n\n The penalty is more severe if: \n\n \n\t for the unlawful advantage the public official breaches his official duties or exceeds his competence, or otherwise abuses his position of authority; or \n\t the offense is committed in criminal association with accomplices or on a commercial scale. \n \n\n Under Section 299 of the Criminal Code , any person who - purporting to influence a public official - requests or receives an unlawful advantage for himself or for a third party, or accepts a promise of such an unlawful advantage, or is in league with the person requesting or accepting the unlawful advantage for a third party on his behest, is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment between one to five years (Abuse of a Function).  \n\n Exercising influence in the context of the application of the referred Section in the Hungarian judicial practice means a deliberate encouragement towards a public official to seek a decision contrary to relevant legal provisions. It is important to note that the influence is not required to be founded and it can be completely pretended, albeit the other person who has an interest in the outcome of the influence, must accept it as true. \n"]
["Who is subject to the legislation?","All natural persons are subject to the legislation who commit the act specified under the relevant Section. \nThe perpetrator of an Active Corruption potentially can be any natural person giving or promising an unlawful advantage to another person working for or on behalf of an economic operator, while in the case of Passive Corruption the perpetrator is a natural person who requests or receives an unlawful advantage in connection with his activities performed for or on behalf of an economic operator. The latter can only be a natural person who performs his activities for or on behalf of an economic operator. \nThe perpetrator of an Active Corruption of Public Officials can be any natural person attempting to bribe a public official. In some cases, the perpetrator of an Active Corruption of Public Officials needs to have special qualities: must be a director of an economic operator, or a person working for or on behalf of the economic operator, vested with the authority to exercise control or supervision. In the case of Passive Corruption of Public Officials, the perpetrator can only be a public official or a foreign public official who requests or receives an unlawful advantage in connection with his actions in an official capacity. \n"]
["Is there criminal liability for corporate entities who have either paid or accepted a bribe payment?"," In the Hungarian criminal law, perpetrators are natural persons. The criminal liability of corporate (legal) entities thus derive from the liability of natural persons and that is why the legislator was to separate the regulations concerning the applicable measures against legal entities and the regulations of the Criminal Code . Based on Act CIV of 2001 on Measures Applicable to Legal Entities (“ CM Act ”) certain measures may be applied against legal entities if the following requirements are met, specified in Subsection (1) of Section 2 of the same Act : the court has imposed punishment on the person committing any intentional criminal act and if the perpetration of such an act was aimed at or has resulted in the legal entity gaining benefit, and the criminal act was committed by: \n\n \n\t the legal entity’s executive officer, its member, employee, officer, managing clerk entitled to represent it, its supervisory board member and/or their representatives, within the legal entity’s scope of activity; or \n\t its member or employee within the legal entity’s scope of activity, and it could have been prevented by the executive officer, the managing clerk or the supervisory board by fulfilling his/her/its supervisory or control obligations. \n \n\n If the Court imposed a penalty or applied reprimand or probation against the natural person, ordered confiscation or confiscation of property for the criminal act defined in Section 2 of the CM Act , it may take the following measures against the legal entity:  \n\n \n\t winding up the legal entity; \n\t limiting the activity of the legal entity; or \n\t imposing a fine. \n \n\n Subsection (2) of Section 3 of the CM Act enumerates conditions that allow for penalizing the legal entity even in cases where the crime specified in Section 2 occurred, but for some reason, the identity of the perpetrator or the criminal liability of the defendant could not be established.   \n\n The measures defined above can be applied even if the criminal act was aimed at or caused the legal entity to gain a benefit, or the criminal act was committed with the use of the legal entity. \n"]
["What is the penalty for individuals violating the law?"," The severity of criminal penalties depends on the specific criminal act and the background of the perpetrator. \n\n Under the crime of Active Corruption, any person who gives or promises unlawful advantage to a person working for or on behalf of an economic operator, or to another person on account of such employee, to induce him to breach his duties is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment not exceeding three years. The penalty is more severe if the criminal offense is committed in connection with a person working for or on behalf of an economic operator who is authorized to act in its name and on its behalf independently. Committing the referred criminal act in a criminal association with accomplices or on a commercial scale is an aggravating circumstance.  \n\n In the case of Passive Corruption, any person who requests or receives an unlawful advantage in connection with his activities performed for or on behalf of an economic operator, for himself or for a third party, or accepts a promise of such an advantage, or is in league with the person requesting or accepting the advantage for a third party on his behest, is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment not exceeding three years. If the perpetrator breaches his official duty in exchange for the unlawful advantage he is punishable by imprisonment between one to five years. Committing the criminal offense in criminal association with accomplices or on a commercial scale is punishable by imprisonment between two to eight years.  \n\n In the event of Active Corruption of Public Officials, any person who attempts to bribe a public official by giving or promising an unlawful advantage to such person or to another person for influencing such official’s actions in an official capacity is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment not exceeding three years. If the unlawful advantage is given to a (foreign) public official to induce him to breach his official duty, exceed his competence or otherwise abuse his position of authority, the penalty is imprisonment between one to five years. \n\n In case of a Passive Corruption of Public Officials, any public official who requests or receives an unlawful advantage in connection with his actions in an official capacity, for himself or for a third party, or accepts a promise of such unlawful advantage, or is in league with the person requesting or accepting the unlawful advantage for a third party on his behest, is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment between one to five years. Passive Corruption of Public Officials has additional aggravating circumstances: \n\n \n\t if the criminal offense is committed by a high-ranking public official, the penalty is imprisonment between two to eight years; or \n\t if the public official for the unlawful advantage breaches his official duties, exceeds his competence or otherwise abuses his position of authority, or if the offense is committed in a criminal association with accomplices or on a commercial scale. \n \n\n Pursuant to the crime of Abuse of a Function, any person who, purporting to influence a public official, requests or receives an unlawful advantage for himself or for a third party, or accepts a promise of such an unlawful advantage, or is in league with the person requesting or accepting the unlawful advantage for a third party on his behest, is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment between one to five years. It constitutes an aggravating circumstance if the perpetrator when carrying out the aforementioned acts establishing an Abuse of a Function-purports to or pretends that he is bribing a public official or pretends to be a public official or commits the criminal offense on a commercial scale, punishable by imprisonment between two to eight years.  \n"]
["Assuming corporate entities are liable for violating the legislation, what is the penalty for corporate entities violating the law?"," Please see the answer to  \"Is there criminal liability for corporate entities who have either paid or accepted a bribe payment?\". \n\n The following measures might be taken against the legal entity:  \n\n \n\t winding up the legal entity; \n\t limiting the activity of the legal entity; or \n\t imposing a fine. \n \n\n Measure, defined in point 1. can only be imposed independently, measures defined in point 2. or 3. can be imposed independently or concurrently. \n"]
["Assuming corporate entities are liable for violating the legislation, does having a compliance program designed to prevent bribery constitute a defense?","Please see the answer to \n\"Is there criminal liability for corporate entities who have either paid or accepted a bribe payment?\".A compliance program designed to prevent bribery does not constitute a defense under Hungarian criminal law. However, during a certain procedure, it might be taken into consideration as a mitigating circumstance by the Court in connection with \nSubsection (4) of \nSection 293 of the \nCriminal Code (Active Corruption of Public Officials) if the person working for or on behalf of the economic operator or on its behalf commits the criminal offense for the benefit of the economic operator or on its behalf. \n"]
["Assuming corporate entities are liable for violating the anticorruption law, is it possible for a corporate entity to reach a deferred prosecution agreement or leniency agreement with the enforcement authorities?","Please see the answer to \n\"Is there criminal liability for corporate entities who have either paid or accepted a bribe payment?\".No such deferred prosecution agreement or leniency agreement with the enforcement authorities is stipulated in the laws of Hungary. Nevertheless, in relation to the crimes of Active Corruption\n(\nSection 290 of the \nCriminal Code) and Active Corruption of Public Officials (\nSection 293 of the \nCriminal Code) the penalty may be reduced without limitation-or dismissed in cases deserving special consideration-against the perpetrator of a criminal if he confesses the act to the authorities first hand and unveils the circumstances of the criminal act. In the case of Passive Corruption (\nSection 291 of the\n Criminal Code) and Passive Corruption of Public Officials (\nSection 294 of the Criminal Code), the unlawfully obtained financial advantage must be surrendered as well in order to be eligible for a penalty reduction. \n"]