Yes

N/A

No such distinction is made.  Generally speaking, government authorities may not require disclosure of attorney-client communications, subject to the crime-fraud exception.  Legal work product materials are subject to the work product protections set forth in Practice Book § 13-3 and are deemed discoverable upon a showing that the party seeking discovery (1) has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the case and (2) is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. 

Connecticut does not utilize the “control group test,” and has instead adopted a subject-matter test similar to the Upjohn approach.  See C. Tait & E. Prescott, Tait’s Handbook of Connecticut Evidence (5th ed. 2013) § 5.21.6.  Specifically, the Connecticut Supreme Court has stated that the attorney-client privilege in the corporate context applies to communications between any official or employee of a corporate entity and the attorney for that entity, provided that (1) the attorney was acting in a professional capacity for the corporation, (2) the communication was made to the attorney by one or more current employees or officials of the corporation, (3) the communication was related to the legal advice sought by the corporation from the attorney, and (4) the communication was made in confidence.  Shew v. Freedom of Info. Comm’n, 245 Conn. 149, 159 (1998).  The burden of proving each element of the privilege, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, rests with the party seeking to assert it.  Blumenthal v. Kimber Mfg., Inc., 265 Conn. 1, 11 (2003).  With regard to this second factor, the Connecticut Supreme Court has held that communications with former employees of a corporation may be protected by the attorney-client privilege if the former employees had a “continuing legal obligation to the principal-organization to furnish the information to the organization.”  Shew, 245 Conn. at 159 n.12.

No; communications with in-house counsel are privileged to the same extent as communications with outside counsel.  See Goldenberg v. Corporate Air, Inc., 189 Conn. 504, 509 (1983), overruled on other grounds by Burger & Burger, Inc. v. Murren, 202 Conn. 660, 662 (1987); Int’l Bus. Machines Corp. v. Murray, No. CV 90-0107445 S, 1990 WL 283846, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 29, 1990) (recognizing continued viability of Goldenberg for principle that in-house counsel communications are privileged to same extent as outside counsel).

N/A

N/A

Yes

The Connecticut Supreme Court has left the contours of the common interest doctrine largely undefined in this state.  Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 249 Conn. 36, 61 & 61 n.33 (1999) (stating that it “need not elaborate on the contours of the ‘common interest’ doctrine in Connecticut in order to determine conclusively that it does not extend to the circumstances of the present case” and recognizing that the doctrine “subsumes a number of principles that are sometimes characterized as separate rules and at other times conflated into a single axiom”).  As set forth in Tait’s Handbook of Connecticut Evidence (5th ed. 2013) § 5.21.5, however, Connecticut case law provides support for the following relevant principles: (1) if two or more persons consult the same attorney on a matter of joint interest, their communications are privileged as to the outside world, though not as to each other in a later controversy between themselves; Pagano v. Ippoliti, 245 Conn. 640, 649-50 (1998); (2) if a client and a third party have a common interest in a matter, that interest may be sufficient to make it unreasonable for the client to expect to maintain confidentiality regarding that third person; see Metro. Life Ins. Co., 249 Conn. at 61-62 (recognizing that where insurer has agreed to provide coverage and defense to insured, insurer and insured have common interest, and thus insured cannot reasonably expect that communications made to his or her attorney would remain confidential from insurer, but that where insurer has declined coverage and defense of insured, insured can reasonably expect those same communications to remain confidential); and (3) communications between codefendants and their joint attorney are privileged when the conversations relate to their participation in a charged offense, although that privilege may later be waived if one of the defendants turns state’s witness to testify against the other in a criminal prosecution.  State v. Cascone, 195 Conn. 183, 187-89 (1985).  

There appears to be no authority that a common interest agreement must be in writing.

Yes, litigation funding is permitting in Connecticut.  There are no professional rules that address litigation funding specifically; however, a 1999 informal opinion by the Connecticut Bar Association’s Standing Committee on Professional Ethics cautions plaintiff’s attorneys who participate in such arrangements “to avoid violating Rule 1.6(a)” of the Connecticut Rules of Professional Conduct—governing attorney-client confidentiality—by having “a significant conversation with the client” about whether the disclosures required by a potential funder “might constitute a waiver of the attorney-client privilege, or render discoverable otherwise undiscoverable information.”  CBA Informal Op. 99-42 (1999) “Advance of Funds to Client by Third Party.”

There appears to be no appellate authority as to whether such communications may be protected.

Yes

• Rule 1.6 of the Connecticut Rules of Professional Conduct
• Olson v. Accessory Controls & Equip. Corp., 254 Conn. 145, 169-177 (2000) (holding that, as matter of first impression, privileged communications may be stripped of their privileged status under crime-fraud exception if communications have been procured with intent to further a civil fraud, overruling Supplee v. Hall, 75 Conn. 17 (1902)).
• Blumenthal v. Kimber Mfg., Inc., 265 Conn. 1, 18-20 (2003) (holding that crime-fraud exception applies only after determination by trial court that there is probable cause to believe that crime or fraud has been attempted or committed and that communication was in furtherance thereof).
   

Yes, Practice Book § 13-3(a).

Practice Book § 13-3(a) provides, in relevant part: 

[A] party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable . . . and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party’s representative only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the case and is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means.  In ordering discovery of such materials when the required showing has been made, the judicial authority shall not order disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representatives of a party concerning the litigation.
 

The Connecticut appellate courts have not expressly ruled on whether an accountant-client privilege exists, although at least one trial court has refused to recognize such a privilege.  See Peebles v. Ayres, No. NNHCV106006879S, 2013 WL 4419337, at *9 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 25, 2013). 

Yes, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-235d(b), a qualified privilege exists “for ‘not court-ordered’ mediation proceedings prohibiting participants (parties, attorneys, mediator) from disclosing ‘any oral or written communication’ obtained during the course of the mediation,” which “prohibition does not apply if the parties agree otherwise or these communications are used in ‘furtherance of settlement [discussions].”  See C. Tait & E. Prescott, Tait’s Handbook of Connecticut Evidence (5th ed. 2013) § 5.76.1.  Any disclosure made in violation of this statute is not admissible as evidence, unless “(1) each of the parties agrees in writing to such disclosure, (2) the disclosure is necessary to enforce a written agreement that came out of the mediation, (3) the disclosure is required by statute or regulation, or by any court, after notice to all parties to the mediation, or (4) the disclosure is required as a result of circumstances in which a court finds that the interest of justice outweighs the need for confidentiality, consistent with the principles of law.”  General Statutes § 52-235d(b).  As discussed in Tait’s Handbook of Connecticut Evidence, the meaning of the term “not court-ordered” lacks clarity, leading the authors to ponder: “Private mediation is clearly not court-ordered, but what if parties are willing to mediate through ‘court-sanctioned’ mediation conducted by court officers?  Being voluntary and not coerced, such mediation ought to be cloaked with a zone of privacy similar to private mediation.”  Id.  Connecticut courts have not yet addressed this apparent ambiguity.

In addition to the above, other Connecticut statutes set forth the parameters of a mediation privilege in specific, limited contexts, including labor mediations; General Statutes § 31-96; family court mediations; General Statutes § 46b-53a(b); and human rights discriminatory practice.  General Statutes § 46a-84(e).
 

Although evidence of an offer to compromise or settle a disputed claim is inadmissible to prove the validity or invalidity of the claim or its amount, such evidence is admissible when introduced for some other purpose.  Conn. Code Evid. Sec. 4-8.  Moreover, statements of fact or admission made by a party in the course of settlement negotiations are expressly recognized by the Connecticut Code of Evidence as admissible. Id.