Yes. The statute governing the attorney-client privilege is found at WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-12-101(a)(i), which provides:

1. The following persons shall not testify in certain respects:
   1. An attorney or a physician concerning a communication made to him by his client or patient in that relation, or his advice to his client or patient. The attorney or physician may testify by express consent of the client or patient, and if the client or patient voluntarily testifies the attorney or physician may be compelled to testify on the same subject[.]

Rule 501 of the Wyoming Rules of Evidence, which applies equally to criminal and civil proceedings, provides that privileges are governed by principles of common law except as provided by the constitution, statute, rules of evidence, or rules promulgated by the Supreme Court of Wyoming.  

N/A

In Wyoming, communications between a client and counsel are protected in criminal and civil contexts under WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-12-101(a)(i), despite the fact the statute is found in the civil code. See Frias v. State, 722 P.2d 135, 140 (Wyo. 1986) (explaining in the absence of a contrary provisions, statutes establishing privilege such as WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-12-101 are said to apply in civil and criminal cases). Criminal matters also cite the Sixth Amendment and the right to effective assistance of counsel as a source for the attorney-client privilege. See Haworth v. State, 840 P.2d 912, 916 (Wyo. 1992) (agreeing that “[t]he essence of the sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel is, indeed, privacy of communication with counsel.”).

As explained below, work product is protected in both the criminal and civil contexts, albeit through different rules.

Wyoming has adopted the “entity rule”, meaning when an attorney is engaged by an entity, the entity is the client and not the shareholders. Bowen v. Smith, 838 P.2d 186, 195 (Wyo. 1992). However, Wyoming has yet to address the extent of the attorney-client privilege to the entity or adopt a specific approach.

One of Wyoming’s leading commentators on ethics and professional responsibility, the late Professor Burman, suggested that Wyoming may be more inclined to adopt the “subject matter” test set forth in the Upjohn decision. John M. Burman, Forming the Lawyer-Client Relationship, Part II Special Considerations When Representing an Organization, Wyo. Law., October 2012, at 48, 49. Again, however, the Wyoming Supreme Court has not adopted a specific rule or approach.

Wyoming has addressed the level of employee that constitutes a “party” for purposes of communicating with represented persons, which may provide further insight as to the approach Wyoming may adopt for purposes of the attorney-client privilege.

In Strawser v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., a Div. of Exxon Corp., 843 P.2d 613, 621 (Wyo. 1992), the lower court had issued a blanket order precluding one party’s counsel from interviewing any employee of the other party, finding all such employees were “represented parties” under Rule 4.2 of the Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct. The Wyoming Supreme Court rejected the trial court’s “blanket” prohibition of all ex parte interviews and instead analyzed a variety of tests. The court ultimately adopted the “alter ego” or “binding admission” approach. Under this approach, “party” is defined “to include corporate employees whose acts or omissions in the matter under inquiry are binding on the corporation (in effect, the corporation's ‘alter egos’) or imputed to the corporation for purposes of its liability, or employees implementing the advice of counsel.” Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). This approach allows counsel to interview employees who were merely witnesses for the act which the corporate employer is sued. Id. at 621-622.

Nothing in Wyoming’s statutes, case law, or the Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct distinguishes between in-house counsel or specially retained outside counsel when it comes to the attorney-client privilege. The standard is whether the communication was expressly made confidential or such that the client could reasonably assume under the circumstances would be understood by the attorney as so intended. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 748 P.2d 283, 289 (Wyo. 1987). Communications between a client and its in-house counsel could satisfy this standard.

Although Wyoming has no authority directly on point, in-house counsel (even if not members of the Wyoming Bar), are subject to the disciplinary authority of Wyoming’s Board of Professional Responsibility. WYO. R. PROF. COND. 8.5(a). In other words, in-house counsel, regardless of their admission to the Wyoming Bar, must comply with the rules and standards set forth in the Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct, which include duties of confidentiality. See Rule 1.6 Confidentiality of information (prohibiting an attorney from revealing confidential information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent or the disclosure is otherwise permitted by law).

Nothing in Wyoming’s statutes, case law, or the Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct preclude in-house counsel from being an active member of the Wyoming bar. Rather, the Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct require in-house counsel to be a member of some United States jurisdiction who are not disbarred or suspended in any jurisdiction. WYO. R. PROF. COND. 5.5(d)(1), cmt. 12.

Yes.

 In Wyoming, the common interest doctrine has only been discussed in the context of when multiple individuals discuss a matter with a single attorney.  The Wyoming Supreme Court explains that the attorney-client privilege is limited to confidential communications.  Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers International Union v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 748 P.2d 283, 289 (Wyo. 1987). When these matters are made public or revealed to third persons, the element of confidentiality is wanting.  Id. at 289–90 (citing 1 McCormick on Evidence § 91, at 217 (E. Cleary, 3rd ed. 1984)). An exception to this rule arises when clients share information on a matter of common interest:
 
When two or more persons, each having an interest in some problem, or situation, jointly consult an attorney, their confidential communications with the attorney, though known to each other, will, of course, be privileged in a controversy of either or both of the clients with the outside world, that is, with parties claiming adversely to both or either of those within the original charmed circle.

Id. at 290 (quoting McCormick, supra at 219).

Wyoming has only addressed the common interest doctrine as it applies to multiple individuals or clients conferring with a single attorney.  See id. (explaining that two individuals shared same attorney and a significant identity of interest and joint effort to oppose the other litigant).  Wyoming’s Supreme Court has not specifically addressed “common interest” or “joint defense” agreements that are commonly entered into amongst multiple parties and their counsel for purposes of litigation strategies.  

The Wyoming Supreme Court has only discussed the common interest doctrine in the context of preserving the attorney-client privilege when communications are made in the presence of a third party. See e.g. Herrick v. Jackson Hole Airport Board, 2019 WY 118, ¶ 9, 452 P.3d 1276 (noting that two opinion letters written by board of airport and disclosed to town and county maintained privileged status because the board, town, and county had a common interest in the subject of the letters). Wyoming has not addressed private agreements for “joint defense” or “common interest” expressly entered into by parties. Therefore, there is no guidance as to whether such agreements are valid and if so, whether they must be reduced to writing.

Rule 1.8(e) of the Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct allows an attorney to provide the following financial assistance to a client:

a lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connection with pending or contemplated litigation, except that: 

1. A lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter; and 
2. A lawyer representing an indigent client may pay court costs and expenses of litigation on behalf of the client. 

The parameters of Rule 1.8(e) are discussed further under the comments section of the rule:

Lawyers may not subsidize lawsuits or administrative proceedings brought on behalf of their clients, including making or guaranteeing loans to their clients for living expenses, because to do so would encourage clients to pursue lawsuits that might not otherwise be brought and because such assistance gives lawyers too great a financial stake in the litigation.  These dangers do not warrant a prohibition on a lawyer lending a client court costs and litigation expenses, including the expenses of medical examination and the costs of obtaining and presenting evidence, because these advances are virtually indistinguishable from contingent fees and help ensure access to the courts.  Similarly, an exception allowing indigent clients to pay court 

costs and litigation expenses regardless of whether these funds will be repaid is warranted.  WYO. R. PROF. COND. 1.8(e), cmt. 10.

No.

Yes.

Rule 1.6(b) sets forth a number of circumstances where an attorney may reveal otherwise confidential information, including to prevent the client from committing a criminal or fraudulent act.  Wyo. R. Prof. Cond. 1.6(b)(1) through (8).  See also Hopkinson v. State, Wyo., 664 P.2d 43, 66–67 (1983).

Yes. The source of the work product doctrine differs for criminal and civil matters.

Work product in the civil context is governed by Rule 26(b)(3), WYO. R. CIV. P.  Generally, a party may not discover documents or tangible things that are prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or its representative (including the party’s attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent.  However, such materials may be discoverable if: (1) they are otherwise discoverable under Rule 26(b)(1) (which defines the scope of discovery), and (2) the party shows that it has substantial need for the materials to prepare its case ad cannot, without undue hardship, obtain their substantial equivalent by other means. Rule 26(b)(3)(A), WYO. R. CIV. P. If the court orders discovery of these materials, it must protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of a party’s attorney or other representative concerning the litigation.  Rule 26(b)(3)(B), WYO. R. CIV. P. 

Work product in the criminal context is governed by Rule 16(a)(2) and 16(b)(2), WYO. R. CRIM. P.  A defendant is not required to produce inspections 

of reports, memoranda, or other internal defense documents made by the defendant, or the defendant’s attorneys or agents in connection with the investigation or defense of the case.  

Rule 26.2, WYO. R. CRIM. P. governs the production of statements obtained by both the defense and prosecution, but expressly states that “statements” do not include the work product of attorneys.

In the civil context, the materials must be: (1) documents and tangible things, (2) prepared in anticipation of litigation, (3) by or for the party asserting the privilege or protection. Rule 26(b)(3), WYO. R. CIV. P.; Thomas v. Harrison, 634 P.2d 328, 331 (Wyo. 1981).

In the criminal context, neither Rule 16, WYO. R. CRIM. P. nor any Wyoming Supreme Court case interpreting that rule sets forth any clear elements to invoke the work product doctrine.

No.

Yes. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-43-103(a) provides:

1. A party to the mediation has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent all mediation participants from disclosing confidential communications.
2. The privilege under this section may be claimed by a representative of the party or by a party, his guardian or conservator, the personal representative of a deceased party, or the successor, trustee or similar representative of a corporation, association, or other organization, whether or not in existence. The person who was the mediator may claim the privilege but only on behalf of the party. The mediator's authority to do so is presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
3. There is no privilege under this section if any one (1) of the following conditions is met:

 (i)  All the parties involved provide written consent to disclose;
(ii)  The communication involves the contemplation of a future crime or harmful act;
(iii)  The communication indicates that a minor child has been or is the suspected victim of child abuse as defined by local statute;
(iv)  The communication was otherwise discoverable prior to the mediation;
(v)  One of the parties seeks judicial enforcement of the mediated agreement.

Yes. WYO. R. EVID. 408 provides:

Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations is likewise not admissible. This rule does not require exclusion when the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.